The Effect of CEO Power on Future Stock Price Crash Risk: Opportunistic Approach to Power
Quarterly Journal of Securities Exchange

Quarterly Journal of Securities Exchange

The Effect of CEO Power on Future Stock Price Crash Risk: Opportunistic Approach to Power

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
alireza ma'toufi 1
Mona Tabarsa 2
1 Department of Accounting, Gorgan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Gorgan, Iran.
2 Department of Accounting, Hakim Jorjani Institute of Higher Education, Gorgan, Iran.
10.22034/jse.2019.11139
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of ceo power on future stock price crash risk of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this research management power is used as the independent variable and Future Stock Price Crash Risk which is used as the dependent variable. The research in was conducted on the Stock Exchange companies during 2011-2015. The logistic regression model was used to analyze the data. The results showed a significant positive correlation between management power and Future Stock Price Crash Risk. The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of ceo power on future stock price crash risk of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this research management power is used as the independent variable and Future Stock Price Crash Risk which is used as the dependent variable. The research in was conducted on the Stock Exchange companies during 2011-2015. The logistic regression model was used to analyze the data. The results showed a significant positive correlation between management power and Future Stock Price Crash Risk.
Keywords
CEO Power
Stock Price
Future Stock Price Crash Risk
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Quarterly Journal of Securities Exchange
Volume 11, Issue 44
Spring 2019
Pages 5-22