نویسندگان
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
According to agency literature, dividend payment to stockholders, on the one hand results in decrease in free cash flow and the possibility of non- optimal investment, and on the other hand, leads to the increase in continuous monitoring by capital market. Hence, the dividend policy is identified as one of the mechanisms which lead to reduction of agency conflicts. Therefore, the present study investigated the impact of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the dividend distribution policies. The sample consisted of 60 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2009. The method of analysis was ordinary least square regression for panel data through fixed effect method. The findings revealed that internal corporate governance mechanisms, namely board of directors size, percent of outsiders in board of directors, the appointment of outsider director as a chairman and management ownership did not have a significant effect on dividend distribution policies of the firms under investigation. Besides, among the external corporate governance mechanisms only institutional ownership did not significantly affected dividend distribution policies. On the contrary, auditor size and debt ratio have negative and significant impact on dividend distribution policies.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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